双语时事系列200:全球变暖，谁来买单？

双语时事：全球变暖，谁来买单？

Poorer countries insist there will be no environmental agreement unless wealthy countries help them adapt to the possible effects of global warming. Samuel Fankhauser offers a blueprint for cooperation.

As the most important environmental conference in more than a decade gets under way in Copenhagen this week, much of the talk, as usual, is on reducing greenhouse-gas emissions.

But there's another issue that needs to be addressed one that is crucial for reaching an overall agreement, but doesn't get nearly as much attention.

That issue is adaptation.

Without a deal on how to cope with the possible effects of climate change, there will be no agreement in Copenhagen or at any future conference, for that matter. That's because developing countries, which likely will suffer some of the worst impact of any significant warming, have made it clear that they will not agree to an emissions-reduction package without substantial help in coping with the increased flooding, drought and disease that many scientists say will result from a warming planet.

Reaching such a deal won't be easy. But the good news is that it's a lot more doable than it was just a few years ago, when just talking about adaptation was thought to mean giving up on reducing emissions. By contrast, a growing number of people now believe that some adaptation is unavoidable.

How much adaptation? That's hard to say. But many scientists doubt we will halt global warming at less than two degrees Celsius (3.6 degress Fahrenheit). That may not sound like much. But just look around to see how fine-tuned our economies are to the current climate. A change of two degrees will potentially affect consumer behavior (where we live, what we wear, where we go on vacation), production decisions (how we produce our food) and the design of our buildings and infrastructure.

More specifically, if temperatures were to rise by two degrees or more, farmers might have to change crops, planting dates, fertilizer and pesticide regimes. Water companies might have to invest in new reservoirs, and maybe build desalination plants to deal with droughts.

Hydroelectric-power stations might have to be adapted to accommodate different rainfall patterns. Electricity grids might have to be strengthened to deal with demand surges during heat waves. Coastal infrastructure, including seaports, power stations, roads, tourist beaches, levees and dikes, might have to be redesigned in response to rising sea levels. Settlements in areas prone to storms, floods or forest fires might have to be fortified or moved.

Health services might have to prepare for heat waves and (in developing countries) for additional cases of malaria and other vector-borne diseases. And that's just for starters.

I'm not predicting all these things will definitely happen. But if just some of these changes are forced upon us, we're talking about major upheavals and the need for major resources, especially in poorer countries.

So, how can developed countries and emerging nations reach an agreement on adaptation? I see the need to come together on four key contentious issues.

Framing the Issue

Most developing countries see support for adaptation measures as, in essence, compensation for the damage caused by the emissions of developed countries. You broke it, you fix it. But such a concept is a nonstarter as far as the developed world is concerned. Compensation implies liability, and if the developed world is 'responsible' for the damage caused by global warming, then payments to compensate for that damage are likely to be more open-ended, outside their control and potentially subject to litigation. In addition, developed countries say, the relative contributions to global warming are evolving, and developing nations are increasingly doing their part in worsening the problem.

It's a pretty fundamental difference, but one that I believe is surmountable. Rather than see adaptation support as compensation for damages, I suggest it is better to consider it as a way to show global solidarity, to fairly deal with a shared challenge. The strong should help out the weak.

This isn't just a matter of semantics. 'Solidarity' takes the question of responsibility off the table, making it more likely the developed countries will go along with an agreement and possibly allowing developing countries to get funds more easily. Such an approach may seem like a nuanced difference, but it has the potential to break down some psychological barriers on both sides, and allow all the parties to move forward.

How Much Money?

This issue is the most obvious, and in many ways the most vexing in the long term: How much money do we need to set aside?

We aren't talking a pittance here. An agreement could mean financial transfers totaling tens of billions of dollars a year, so the debate is going to be a fierce one. Clearly, the developing countries are going to be looking for as much as possible, while the industrial countries are going to try to keep the amount of money they have to contribute at what they consider will be a reasonable, and presumably lower, level.

The problem right now is that nobody knows for sure what adaptation will cost. Some rough estimates exist: The World Bank figures that adaptation costs might total $75 billion to $100 billion a year by 2030; the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate commissioned a study that came to roughly the same conclusion. But both organizations admit their figures are speculative. And the reality is that adding up the countless measures people may need to take to deal with climate change is pretty much impossible.

So let's not even try at this point. Negotiators in Copenhagen do not need to agree on a final figure. Instead, they should agree on an initial target amount, based on the World Bank and the U.N. figures, and set up a review process to adjust payments as we find out more about our adaptation needs.

What's more, payments can be phased to start with priority needs, such as steps to deal with current climate events things like storm-warning systems and crop-insurance programs. Many of these initial steps will be relatively cheap.

In a world where so much is uncertain and our understanding is bound to improve, it would be irrational to lock in our spending in advance. It is like the Federal Reserve freezing interest rates for several years ahead; we know there will be developments that require fine-tuning.

Who Makes the Decisions?

The third place where we need agreement in Copenhagen is how adaptation funding should be governed that is, who makes spending decisions, and how do they decide on spending priorities?

Again, the disagreement is pretty basic: Everybody wants to call the shots. Developed countries believe the traditional institutions, such as the World Bank and the Global Environment Facility, should play the same roles with adaptation funds as they do with development aid evaluating projects, handing out funds, monitoring their success or failure. After all, developed countries say, they have a responsibility to their taxpayers to make sure adaptation money is well spent. He who pays the piper calls the tune.

But developing nations fear these traditional institutions, dominated by developed nations, will be too slow and too stingy. And they argue that adaptation funding is a different animal than development aid. They object to being forced once again into the role of the weak and presumably grateful recipients of aid from donor countries, when they believe it was these donor countries that caused the problem in the first place.

Countries reached a breakthrough on the question two years ago in Bali, when they set up a new Adaptation Fund governed by a board made up of representatives from both developed and developing countries.

But the truth is that such power sharing so far exists in theory only. The Adaptation Fund consists of little more than a governing board at this point, and is responsible for a small fraction of the money set aside to deal with the impact of climate change. Most funds targeting such assistance are still doled out by the traditional institutions.

In the future, developing countries insist, the Adaptation Fund should wield control over more of the funds directed at adaptation spending. Rather than relying on institutions such as the World Bank to identify, appraise, implement and monitor adaptation projects, they say, such oversight should be the province of individual countries.

Complicating matters is how impossible it is to tell whether any particular need is the result of climate change or simply normal climate variability. A drought is a drought, no matter what the underlying cause. And yet for developed nations, the cause determines whether the money should be funded separately from baseline development aid, or as part of it.

One possible solution is to let developing countries write their own development and adaptation plans in consultation with aid agencies. These plans already exist to coordinate development aid, but from now on they should also cover adaptation.

This will only work for countries that have the governance necessary to control such spending. Where that is not the case adaptation spending would have to be overseen by the more traditional aid institutions.

Where the Money Comes From

The fourth issue that needs to be settled in Copenhagen is the actual source of financing.

This has to be one of the worst moment in decades to raise funding for international causes. After bank bailouts and multibillion-dollar economic-stimulus packages, most industrialized countries are facing massive government deficits. They are preparing for painful spending cuts over the medium term. It is an unfortunate moment, clearly, to talk about new funding commitments.

Still, even if times were less dire, the funding discussion would be fraught. The easiest way by far would be for developed countries to simply increase their aid budgets. But developing countries balk at that for two reasons.

First, developed countries have a history of generous pledges on which they don't deliver. Second, even if they did pay up, there is a strong suspicion that part of the payments would simply be relabeled development aid. That is, the money would not be an addition to what is already pledged.

The search is therefore on for new, independent sources of money. This is easier said than done. New sources of finance usually mean giving revenue-raising powers to international organizations such as the United Nations, or curtailing the fiscal sovereignty of national treasuries, or both. Finance ministers will veto any such proposal as a matter of principle. Would the Senate ratify a treaty that allows the U.N. to raise money directly from U.S. corporations? Unlikely.

The complication in Copenhagen therefore is to find a source of money that maintains the sovereignty of national treasuries but gives confidence to developing countries that the money will be forthcoming. So far the silver bullet is still missing, but it is likely that several sources of finance will have to be tapped . They will have different features, appealing to the different constituencies to different degrees. But revenues will almost certainly have to be shared with other climate-change objectives, such as the development and dissemination of new technologies.

Many options have been put forward. One of the most intriguing suggestions is the sale of additional emission rights to countries unable to meet their emission-reduction targets. Another proposal is a tax on international aviation and shipping, two important sources of carbon emissions that are currently outside the Kyoto Protocol, the international treaty to fight global warming.

The main source of support for the Adaptation Fund at the moment is a levy on emission-reduction projects under the international carbon-trading program set up by the Kyoto Protocol. The levy gives 2% of the emission-reduction credits generated by, say, a new wind farm or a reforestation project to the Adaptation Fund, which then can sell the credits on the secondary market. Although it goes against economic logic to tax emission reductions, rather than emissions themselves, the levy could be extended, particularly if Copenhagen leads to the expected reform of the global carbon market.

The outcome of the Copenhagen summit is still in the balance. We can expect that there will be some sort of agreement, but how substantial it will be is very much up in the air. A deal on adaptation would go a long way to secure a successful Copenhagen outcome.

SAMUEL FANKHAUSER

(Mr. Fankhauser is a Senior Fellow at the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change at the London School of Economics. He can be reached at reports@wsj.com)

一些经济欠发达的国家坚称，除非发达国家帮他们适应全球变暖可能带来的不利影响，否则无法在环境问题上达成共识。对此，塞缪尔·凡克豪瑟(Samuel Fankhauser)提出一份合作蓝图。

十几年来最重要的环境会议本周即将在哥本哈根召开，和以往一样，讨论大多集中在温室气体的减排上。

然而，还有另一个问题急需解决──这个问题对能否达成一个整体协议至关重要，但尚未引起人们足够的关注。

这就是适应机制问题(adaptation)。

如果不能就如何处理气候变化可能带来的影响达成共识，哥本哈根会议就无法达成协议──而且今后的任何会议也将无功而返。这是因为，发展中国家可能会受到气候严重变暖所带来的一些最坏影响，而这些国家明确表示，除非得到大量帮助以应对日益增多的洪水、干旱和疾病，否则他们不会同意二氧化碳减排方案。许多科学家认为，地球变暖将会引发上述自然灾害。

在这方面达成共识并不容易，但好消息是，这件事的可行性已比几年前大为提高，当时只要一谈起适应机制，就会被认为是一种放弃减排的言论。与其形成鲜明对比的是，现在越来越多的人相信，一定程度的适应机制是不可避免的。

但多大的程度呢？这很难说。很多科学家怀疑人类很难将全球变暖控制在2摄氏度之内（即3.6华氏度）。这听上去可能不是很多，但只要环视一下，你就能看出我们的经济发展与目前的气候状况是多么息息相关。两摄氏度的变化可能会影响人们的消费习惯（住在哪里，穿什么衣服，去哪里度假）、生产决策（如何生产食物）以及建筑物和基础设施的设计等等。

再谈具体一点，如果温度上升2度或以上，农民种植的作物、下种时间、肥料和杀虫剂的种类可能都必须更换。供水公司可能得投资建设新的水库，并建立海水淡化厂以应对干旱。

水电站可能得适应不同的降雨规律，电网要增加供电能力以满足高温季节的用电高峰。海港、电站、道路、度假沙滩、堤岸和壕沟等沿海基础设施得重新设计以应对上升的海平面。易受风暴、洪水或森林火灾侵袭的定居地可能要加固或迁徙。

医疗机构可能得准备好迎接热浪引发的疾病，在一些发展中国家，还会出现更多的疟疾等虫媒传染病。而这一切还只是开始。

我并不是预言这些事情必然发生，但如果其中一些变化真的降临，就会带来剧变，并由此产生大量资源需求，尤其是对发展中国家而言。

那么，发达国家和新兴市场国家怎样才能在适应问题上达成一致意见？我认为需要在四个关键性的争议问题上形成共识。

怎么看待适应问题？

从本质上看，大多数发展中国家将适应机制视为发达国家为其碳排放导致的气候问题所付出的赔偿。谁搞坏的，谁负责。但对发达国家而言，这种观念于事无补。赔偿意味着责任，如果发达国家应该对全球变暖引发的损失“负责”，那么相关赔偿有可能将是无限期和不可控的，而且可能会面临诉讼。此外，发达国家称，助长全球变暖的相关因素也在不断变化，发展中国家正在日益导致全球变暖进一步恶化。

这是一个根本上的意见分歧，但我相信还是可以克服的。我建议不要把适应机制视为对环境损害的赔偿，而是把它看作一种显示世界各国休戚与共、公平应对共同面对的挑战的方式。实力更强的一方应当帮助实力较弱的一方。

“休戚与共”不只是一种态度，而是让各国不再纠缠于责任归属问题，使发达国家更有可能支持一项决议，同时可能令发展中国家更容易获得资金支持。这种做法也许看上去有点像和稀泥，却有可能打破两大阵营的一些心理壁垒，让双方各自都往前走一步。

需要多少资金？

这个问题最为突出，从很多方面来看，也是一个长期最令人头疼的问题。我们需要拿出多少钱来解决适应问题？

这可不是一笔小数目。一旦达成协议意味着每年多达数百亿美元的资金转移，因此相关的争论一定会非常激烈。很明显，发展中国家希望援助资金越多越好，而发达国家则试图把要拿出来的钱控制在他们认为的合理水平之内，可想而知也是一个较低的水平。

现在的问题是，没人能百分之百地知道为适应气候变暖需要付出多少成本，只有一些大致的估计。世界银行(World Bank)预测，到2030年前，适应成本可能每年在750亿到1000亿美元之间。《联合国气候变化框架公约》(United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change)委托发起的一项研究也得出大致相同的结论。然而，两大组织都承认，他们的数字只是纯理论的；在实践中，将应对气候变化所需实施的数不胜数的措施汇总出一个成本，基本上是不可能完成的任务。

因此，我们就不必在这一点上纠缠了。哥本哈根会议的谈判代表用不着在最终数字上达成共识，只要同意一个基于世界银行和联合国数字的起始资金目标就可以，同时建立一个评估流程，以便在对适应需求有更多了解后调整资金规模。

此外，资金也可以分期给付，先从最重要的项目开始，如应对目前气候问题的一些措施──暴雨预警系统和农作物保险等，其中不少项目的启动资金相对较少。

未来充满不确定性，我们对事物的理解也始终需要深入；因此，事先锁定成本的做法是不可取的，就像美联储不可能事先锁定未来几年的利率一样。我们知道，未来会出现新的变化，需要做出相应的调整。

谁来做决定？

哥本哈根会议需要达成的第三项共识是如何管理适应基金─也就是说，花钱的决策由谁来下，支出的优先次序如何确定？

同样，分歧是必然存在的，谁都想在这方面说了算。发达国家认为，世界银行和全球环境基金(Global Environment Facility)等传统组织所扮演的角色应该与其提供国际援助时一样──评估项目、调配资金、监督项目成败。不管怎么说，发达国家觉得他们要对其纳税人负责，以确保适应基金用在了实处。也就是说，谁出钱，谁做主。

但发展中国家担心，这些传统组织都由发达国家掌控，不但动作慢，而且会很小气。他们的观点是，适应基金与国际援助不同。他们不想再次被迫扮演一个弱者的角色──从捐助国那里获得援助，还得感恩戴德。发展中国家认为，全球变暖首先是那些捐助国搞出来的问题。

在这方面，各国在两年前的巴厘岛气候会议上有所突破，新设了一个适应基金(Adaptation Fund)，由两大阵营的代表共同组成理事会来进行管理。

但现状是，这种权力共享机制只在理论层面存在。适应基金目前基本上只有一个管理委员会，只负责很小一部分用于应对气候变化影响的资金。绝大多数这类援助资金的控制权还掌握在传统组织手中。

在未来，发展中国家要求，适应基金应将更多旨在适应气候变化的援助资金纳入其管辖范围。他们表示，这类管理职责应该由接受资金的各国自己来履行，而不是依靠世界银行这样的组织去发现、评估、实施和监控气候适应项目。

让事情更为复杂的是，很难分清楚某个适应需求是由于气候变化引起的，还是由于正常的气候波动引起的。对遇灾国家来说，旱灾就是旱灾，不管背后的引发因素是什么；但对发达国家来说，灾害起因决定了援助资金是应当独立于基本的发展援助资金之外还是作为其一部分。

一个可能的解决方案是，让发展中国家在与援助机构磋商后制定自己的发展及适应计划。目前已经有了这类计划以协调发展援助，但从现在起应当将适应基金也纳入其中。

这个解决方案只适用于那些有能力管理援助资金的国家，否则适应基金的使用应该由那些更有经验的援助机构来管理。

钱从哪里来？

哥本哈根会议需要解决的第四个问题是资金的实际来源。

纵观近几十年，现在是为国际事务筹集资金的最差时期之一。经过银行救助行动和几千亿美元经济刺激计划之后，大多数发达国家面临巨额财政赤字，正准备在相当长一段时间内痛苦地削减开支。很明显，现在来讨论新的筹资承诺有点不合时宜。

尽管时机并不那么合适，但适应基金的筹资讨论势在必行。目前，最简单的方式是让发达国家提高其援助预算，但发展中国家对此并不热情，原因有两个：

首先，发达国家经常开空头支票，承诺得很多，但不履行诺言。其次，即使发达国家真的给钱，发展中国家也很担心其中一部分资金最终是以国际援助的名义出现，也就是说，这部分钱包括在已经给出的援助承诺之中，而不是额外的资金。

因此，发展中国家寻求的是新的、独立的资金来源，但这谈何容易。新的资金来源通常意味着将筹款权力交给联合国等国际组织，或在国家财政政策上受制于人，或两者皆有。一个国家的财政部长会否决任何此类建议，这是个原则问题。举个例子来说，美国参议院会不会通过一项让联合国向美国企业直接筹款的公约？不太可能。

因此，哥本哈根会议的复杂性在于找到一种资金来源方式，既能保证国家财政主权不受侵犯，又能让发展中国家相信未来资金可以到位。目前，皆大欢喜的解决方案还是没有，也许需要同时借助几种不同的融资渠道。这些资金来源都有各自的特点，在不同程度上迎合着不同的需求。不过，几乎可以肯定的是，筹集的资金将不得不与其他气候变化目标共享，如新技术的开发和传播等。

已有很多筹资建议浮出水面，其中最吸引人的是向未能达到减排目标的国家出售额外的碳排放额度。另一个建议是向国际航空和海运公司征税，这是目前没有纳入应对全球变暖问题的国际公约《京都议定书》(Kyoto Protocol)的两大重要碳排放源。

目前，适应基金的主要资金来源是对《京都议定书》制定的国际碳交易机制所覆盖的碳减排项目征税。这种机制规定，新的风力农场或重新造林工程等项目所减排的碳额度中的2%贡献给适应基金，用于在二级市场上出售以换取资金。虽然向碳减排征税而不是向碳排放本身征税有违经济常识，但这种机制可以进一步扩大实施范围，尤其是假如哥本哈根会议能像预期那样给全球碳交易市场带来变革的话。

哥本哈根峰会的结果尚未确定，我们预期会议将达成某种形式上的协议，但协议能有多少实质性内容仍是未知数。哥本哈根会议能否获得成功，在适应机制方面达成协议任重而道远。

本文选自上海新东方学校惠瑾的博客，博客链接地址：http://blog.hjenglish.com/huijin

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