双语新闻：人民币汇率走低可能在中国引发的危机

　　Investors worried about a Chinese financial crisis want to know when and how it will happen. They have focused on the fast build-up of debt, much of it in shadow banking, and over-investment in housing. But China’s currency could turn out to be the trigger in the same way US subprime mortgages touched off the global financial crisis.

　　担心中国发生金融危机的投资者想知道，危机何时、以何种形式到来。他们一直关注中国债务的快速积累(一大块发生在影子银行领域)以及房地产投资过高。但中国的汇率可能最终成为引发危机的导火索，正如美国次级抵押贷款引发全球金融危机那样。

　　Beijing will not manage to rebalance growth towards consumer spending without the help of currency depreciation. To the surprise of many observers, the People’s Bank of China has engineered a modest but significant decline in the renminbi. But more weakness could be lethal for arbitrage and leverage strategies based on expectations that the currency was certain to keep rising.

　　若没有人民币贬值的帮助，北京方面将无法实现向消费者支出倾斜的增长再平衡。让许多观察人士感到意外的是，中国央行(PBoC)引导了一次温和但意义重大的人民币汇率下跌。但对基于人民币肯定继续升值预期的套利和杠杆策略而言，人民币进一步走弱可能是毁灭性的。 　　Lombard Street Research estimates that the renminbi is between 15 and 25 per cent above fair value. Overvaluation has already hurt corporate profits, which have been flat for two years. Corporate debt as a share of gross domestic product has surged 15 percentage points during that time, while corporate deposits have hardly changed. This suggests that bank lending to companies is being used to pay interest on old loans rather than for new productive activity.

　　据朗伯德街研究公司(Lombard Street Research)估算，人民币汇率目前比其公允价值高出15%至25%。估值过高已然伤害了企业利润，过去两年来企业利润一直没什么起色。过去两年，企业债务与国内生产总值(GDP)之比大幅升高15个百分点，而企业存款几乎没有变化。这表明，企业从银行获得的贷款正用于偿还旧债利息，而不是扩大再生产。

　　Arbitrage game

　　套利游戏

　　The PBoC intervened to weaken the renminbi before widening its trading band. It did so both to change entrenched market perceptions and because the economy needs a lower exchange rate.

　　中国央行在扩大人民币汇率交易区间之前，通过干预压低了汇率。这么做有两个原因，一是为了改变根深蒂固的市场预期，二是因为中国经济需要更低的汇率。

　　In the absence of further depreciation it will be hard for companies to keep taking a hit to the balance sheet without slashing investment, jobs and wages. But the actual and expected rise in the renminbi has spawned an arbitrage game since the middle of 2010 that will inflict heavy losses if the currency falls 10 to 15 per cent.

　　如果人民币不进一步贬值，中国企业不削减投资、裁员和减薪的话，资产负债表持续受损将让它们很难熬。但自2010年年中以来，人民币的实际与预期升值已引发了大量的套利活动，倘若人民币贬值10%至15%，这些套利将遭受巨大的损失。

　　It all started when Beijing expanded its fledgling renminbi trade settlement scheme in June 2010 so eligible firms in China could pay for imports and exports of goods and services in their own currency rather than the dollar. In the middle of 2010 Beijing also allowed the renminbi to start rising again. Chinese investors saw the perfect opportunity to take advantage of renminbi appreciation and interest rate differentials.

　　这一切都源于北京方面在2010年6月扩大了施行不久的人民币贸易结算机制，于是符合条件的在华企业可以用人民币而不是美元来进行商品与服务进出口的结算。2010年年中，北京方面还再次允许人民币开始升值。中国投资者从中看到了从人民币升值和利差中获利的绝佳机会。

　　Chinese groups have used letters of credit to take out foreign-currency loans offshore as part of the scheme. This has often involved importing metals, such as copper or nickel, so it was not fraudulent. Hard commodities played the role of money to circumvent capital controls.

　　中国企业依照人民币贸易结算机制，利用信用证获得离岸外币贷款。这经常涉及到进口铜或镍等金属，所以不存在欺诈。硬商品发挥了规避资本管制的作用。

　　The imported goods were sold and the proceeds invested in either bank accounts or wealth management products in China. If the money was placed on deposit, returns depended largely on continued renminbi appreciation given interest rate differentials. Chinese groups could typically borrow in Hong Kong at 3 per cent, while bank deposit rates in China range from 3 per cent to 4.8 per cent.

　　企业将进口到境内的商品卖掉，收入或存入银行，或投资理财产品。如果这笔钱变成了存款，在给定的利差之下，则回报主要依赖于人民币持续升值。中国企业通常可以在香港以约3%的利率获得贷款，而内地的银行存款利率则在3%至4.8%之间。

　　One way to estimate the size of this arbitrage is to look at the claims of Hong Kong banks on mainland banks and non-banks. These more than tripled to over Rmb2.5tn ($415bn) between the middle of 2010 and the end of 2013.

　　有一个办法可以估计这一套利活动的规模，即考察香港银行对内地银行和非银行机构的债权。2010年年中至2013年底，这些债权增加了两倍多，达到2.5万亿元人民币(合4150亿美元)。

　　It is also worth noting that foreign-currency exposure is much higher when measured by nationality of the borrower than residence – which is how balance-of-payments figures are compiled. Data from the Bank for International Settlements show Chinese nationals had international debt securities totalling $273bn at the end of 2013, more than five times the sum by residency.

　　同样值得关注的是，当以借款人的国籍而不是居住地来衡量时，外汇风险敞口要大得多。目前编制国际收支平衡表时使用的是居住地。国际清算银行(BIS)数据显示，2013年底，中国人持有的国际债务证券总额达2730亿美元，比以居住地计算的总额高出4倍以上。

　　‘Bear Stearns moment’

　　“贝尔斯登(Bear Stearns)时刻”

　　A lower renminbi could cause a scramble for liquidity, pushing asset prices down when debt in foreign currency needs to be repaid. Every time the authorities have introduced regulations to curb the arbitrage – or more recently when the PBoC pushed down the renminbi – market liquidity has come under pressure.

　　当需要偿还外币债务时，人民币汇率走低可能引起流动性吃紧，拉低资产价格。每当当局引入监管措施抑制套利活动时——比如近来中国央行压低人民币汇率——市场流动性都会承压。

　　Another aspect of China’s financial house of cards is that a lot of the money raised abroad has been funnelled via wealth management products into Chinese corporate loans, some of which will sour. Many of these will mature in the next few months, testing the system, especially if Beijing does not intervene to prevent defaults, as it did in January.

　　中国金融“纸牌屋”的另一方面在于，大量从境外筹得的资金已通过理财产品变成了中国企业的贷款，其中部分贷款将成为坏账。许多贷款将在未来几个月到期，届时将考验中国金融体系，尤其是如果北京方面像今年1月一样，不进行干预以防止违约的话。

　　Much like subprime lending in the US, the size of the problem is clouded in uncertainty. China’s “Bear Stearns moment” could be just around the corner. But Beijing still has ammunition to overcome a liquidity crunch and financial distress eventually. Even assuming that half of household and net non-financial-sector debt is bad and zero is recovered, the state could explicitly assume the liabilities and its gross debt would still be “only” 110 per cent of GDP.

　　与美国次级贷款非常相像的是，问题的严重性笼罩在不确定性的阴影中。中国的“贝尔斯登”时刻可能就要来临。但北京方面仍有最终战胜流动性紧缩和金融危机的“弹药”。即便假定有一半的家庭贷款及非金融部门的净债务成为坏账、全部蒙受损失，中国政府也可以明确宣称，这些负债和政府的总债务仍将“仅为”GDP的110%。

　　Doubling the government’s debt would be manageable if Beijing were to clean up the banks properly and reform its financial system. But this no longer seems enough to stave off some sort of crisis.

　　如果中国政府合理整顿银行业并改革金融体系的话，政府债务翻一番也将是可以控制的。但这么做似乎已不足以避免某种危机的到来。