日本下坡路上的赢家

　　A decade lost to deflation has changed the landscape in Ginza, Tokyo’s premium shopping district. On the main street, a Gucci store has been replaced by low-cost fashion outlet XXI Forever. Next door to luxury jeweller Mauboussin, the casual clothes retailer g.u. is doing a brisk business offering cotton maxi dresses for Y990.

　　迷失于通缩中的10年，改变了东京高档购物区银座(Ginza)的景象。在主要购物街上，古驰(Gucci)门店已被低成本时装公司XXI Forever的店铺所取代。在豪华珠宝商Mauboussin的隔壁，休闲服饰零售商g.u.生意兴隆，店里销售的棉质长裙售价990日元。

　　Japan has been mired in deflation since 1999, a period known as the “lost decade”. Consumer prices, excluding food and energy, have fallen every year since, with the exception of 2008, when prices were flat. Meanwhile, nominal gross domestic product, which reflects the impact of deflation, has fallen from Y505tn in 1999 to Y468tn ($5.8tn) last year.

　　自1999年以来，日本一直受到通缩的困扰，这一时期被称作“失落的10年”(lost decade)。1999年以后，消费价格（不包括食品和能源）每年都在下跌——2008年除外，当年价格与上年持平。与此同时，反映通缩影响的名义国内生产总值(GDP)，从1999年的505万亿日元降至去年的468万亿日元(合5.8万亿美元)。

　　The long-term slump has forced businesses in Japan to slash costs and, in some cases, completely rethink their business model. Some Japanese companies have managed to avoid the worst effects of deflation and even thrive in difficult economic circumstances. As such, they offer some valuable lessons for businesses settling down for the long haul in the beleaguered economies of the west.

　　经济长期滑坡迫使日本企业大幅削减成本，一些日本企业不得不彻底重新思考它们的业务模式。一些日本企业成功避免了通缩的最糟糕影响，甚至在艰难的经济状况下走向繁荣。因此，它们为那些将在遭遇困境的西方经济体中长期处于艰难境地的企业提供了一些重要经验。

　　Japanese companies that have succeeded during sluggish times have largely done so by building on their core strengths to develop value-added products and by finding new channels for those products.

　　在经济乏力时期获得成功的日本企业，大多凭借的是建立核心优势来开发增值产品，并为这些产品找到新的销售渠道。

　　One such company is Toray, which generates nearly 40 per cent of its revenues and about a third of operating profits from fibres and textiles – a business that has historically shifted from developed countries to lower-cost emerging markets.

　　东丽(Toray)就是一家这样的公司，该公司近40%的收入和约三分之一的营业利润来自纤维和纺织品，这种业务过去已经从发达国家转向成本较低的新兴市场。

　　What enabled Toray to escape the fate of pioneers in the industry such as Courtaulds, the UK group that was finally broken up and sold off, was its determination to persevere with basic research and development, even though it might take decades to bear fruit. A prime example was its refusal to give up on carbon fibre, an extremely lightweight but sturdy material, which many in the industry, including Courtaulds, eventually abandoned because of a seeming lack of profitable applications.

　　让东丽得以摆脱英国Courtaulds（最终被分拆并出售）等行业先驱命运的，是该公司决心坚持基础研发，尽管这可能需要数十年才能取得成果。一个主要的例子是，东丽拒绝放弃碳纤维，这种材料重量极轻，但非常结实，由于看似缺乏可带来盈利的应用，包括Courtaulds在内的业内很多企业最终都放弃了这种材料。

　　“Toray was pressured by analysts to get rid of the [carbon fibre] business but it refused, saying carbon fibre was one of its strengths,” says Daisuke Taniyama, a consultant at Nomura Research Institute, the research arm of the investment bank.

　　野村证券(Nomura)研究机构野村综合研究所(Nomura Research Institute)咨询顾问Daisuke Taniyama表示：“东丽对来自分析师的放弃（碳纤维）业务的压力说不，并表示碳纤维是其优势之一。”

　　Toray believed that carbon fibre could be used to make aircraft so its executives visited Boeing repeatedly in the 1970s to market the idea. More than 30 years later, Toray is working with Boeing on the 787 Dreamliner, which uses carbon fibre for 50 per cent of its body in terms of weight.东丽认为，碳纤维可以被用来制造飞机，因此上世纪70年代，该公司高管曾多次访问波音(Boeing)，来推销这一想法。30多年后，东丽正与波音在787梦幻客机(787 Dreamliner)上合作，碳纤维占这种飞机机体总重量的50%。

　　“The important thing is to look at the long term,” says Norihiko Saitou, senior vice-president. “Companies which face pressure to produce strong results on a quarterly basis or where the top management changes every few years cannot do what Toray did.”

　　“重要的是要有长远的眼光，”东丽高级副总裁齐藤典彦(Norihiko Saitou)表示，“那些面临创造强劲季度业绩压力、或者每几年就更换高级管理层的企业，无法做到东丽所成就的。”

　　Equally important was Toray’s decision to work directly with Boeing, bypassing the heavy machinery makers that would normally buy its materials, process them into parts and supply Boeing with those parts.

　　同样重要的是，东丽决定绕过重型机械制造商，直接与波音合作，这些机械制造商通常会购买东丽的材料，将其加工成零配件并供应给波音。

　　Toray has also struck a pioneering relationship with Uniqlo, the fashion brand, which the companies describe as “a virtual integration”.

　　东丽还与服装品牌优衣库(Uniqlo)建立了开创性关系，两家公司称这一关系是一种“实质上的整合”。

　　The collaboration has resulted in innovative new textiles, such as Heattech, which uses technical fibres that generate and retain warmth by absorbing body moisture, and Sarafine, which absorbs moisture to keep users dry in the summer heat.

　　这种合作带来了创新性的新型纺织品，例如Heattech和Sarafine，前者采用通过吸收人体水分发热并保温的高技术纤维，后者吸收水分让使用者在夏季高温下保持身体干爽。

　　Mr Saitou says Toray’s close collaboration with these companies was critical in developing new applications for its materials. “Many Japanese companies believe that if they didn’t invent something, it has little value. Toray used to be that way too but realised that customers have expertise that Toray does not.”

　　齐藤典彦表示，在为其材料开发新的应用方面，东丽与这些公司的紧密合作至关重要。“很多日本企业认为，如果没有发明，它们几乎就没有任何价值。东丽也曾经这样认为，但后来发现，客户拥有东丽所不具备的专业技能。”

　　Fujifilm has also successfully used its core strengths to offset pressures that might have resulted in bankruptcy, as witnessed by the fate of its one-time rival, Kodak.

　　富士胶片公司(Fujifilm)也成功利用其核心优势，抵消了本可能会导致其破产（曾经的竞争对手柯达(Kodak)的命运就证明了这点）的压力。

　　In Fujifilm’s case, deflation has been compounded by the even more devastating rapid demise of its photographic film business. When the company realised that digital photography would eventually kill off its core business, rather than let someone else do the job, it decided to take the initiative in developing the new technology itself. At the same time, it implemented a major restructuring programme to shift its business away from photographic film and develop new businesses in growth areas where it had core strengths.

　　在富士的例子里，摄影胶片业务更具灾难性的迅速灭亡加剧了通缩的影响。当该公司意识到，数码摄影将最终扼杀其核心业务时，该公司不是把数码摄影拱手让给其他人来做，而是决定先发制人，自己开发这项新技术。同时，该公司实施了一项大规模重组计划，将其业务重心从摄影胶片上转走，在拥有核心优势的增长领域开发新业务。

　　“It was called the second founding and there were no sacred cows,” says Shigehiro Nakajima, executive vice-president. “In our case, we had strong chemical expertise and nanotechnology, which we combined to make things that others cannot copy. If it’s something that others can copy, prices will fall quickly. It’s important to have products that others cannot compete with.”

　　“我们称之为二次组建，没有什么神圣不可侵犯的东西，”富士执行副总裁中岛成博(Shigehiro Nakajima)表示，“就我们的情况而言，我们具备强大的化学专业技能和纳米技术，我们将它们结合起来，制造出他人无法复制的东西。如果其他人可以复制，那么价格将迅速下跌。因此拥有其他人无法竞争的产品很重要。”

　　For example, Fujifilm has more than 70 per cent of the global market for TAC film, which is a component of photographic film but is also used in flat-panel displays. There has been strong demand because of the spread of flat-panel televisions but Fujifilm and Konica Minolta are the only companies that can manufacture it.

　　例如，富士占全球TAC膜市场的70%以上，这种材料用于摄影胶片，还用于平板显示器。由于平板电视的普及，这种材料需求旺盛，但富士和柯尼卡美能达(Konica Minolta)是仅有的能够生产这种材料的公司。

　　Fujifilm also branched out into cosmetics, using its expertise in collagen, which is the main raw material of photographic film, and nanotechnology. Fujifilm has a long history of research into preventing the oxidisation of collagen, which is the cause both of the discolouration of film and the ageing of skin.

　　富士还利用其在胶原蛋白和纳米技术方面的专业技能，将触角延伸至化妆品领域。胶原蛋白是摄影胶片的主要原材料。在防止胶原蛋白氧化的研究方面，富士有着很长的历史，而胶原蛋白氧化是胶片褪色和肌肤老化的原因。

　　Deflation in Japan continues to put downward price pressure on its digital compact cameras but Fujifilm still makes those cameras, which it is able to sell in emerging economies. For the Japanese market it is shifting its focus to high-end cameras, which have sold unexpectedly well and have helped raise overall margins.

　　日本的通缩继续对富士的小型数码相机业务构成价格下行压力，但该公司仍在生产这种相机，并能在新兴经济体销售。对于日本市场，该公司正将其主要精力放在高端照相机上，高端相机的销售出人意料地好，这帮助提升了整体利润率。

　　Such a shift to high-end products might seem counterintuitive in a deflationary environment but Fujifilm is not the only company that has benefited from that strategy.

　　在通缩的环境下，转向高端产品似乎是违反直觉的，但富士并非唯一一家受益于该战略的公司。

　　Pola Orbis, a direct sales and mail-order cosmetics group, responded to deflationary pressures by beefing up its most expensive line-up of moisturisers and creams costing Y10,000 or more and selling them at their salons for the first time. “We didn’t consider lowering prices, because Pola’s strength is in premium skin care,” says Akira Fujii, vice-president of Pola Orbis Holdings.

　　采用直销和邮购的日本化妆品集团宝丽奥蜜思(Pola Orbis)对通缩压力做出的回应是，加强其最昂贵的、售价在1万日元或以上的保湿霜和护肤霜系列，并在其美容院里首次销售。该公司副总裁藤井彰(Akira Fujii)表示：“我们没有考虑过降价，因为宝丽的优势在高端护肤领域。”

　　The company, which began life in 1929 selling its products to housewives door-to-door, recognised that in order to keep the high-end Pola brand from flagging, it needed to strengthen the close relationship with its customers that had helped it to grow in its earlier years.

　　该公司于1929年创建，最初是将其产品挨家挨户地销售给家庭主妇。该公司意识到，为了让宝丽这个高端品牌不至于衰落，需要增强与消费者的紧密关系，是这些消费者在更早的时期帮助其发展壮大。

　　“The biggest step we took was to invite people to the salons, to understand their skin better and to build a relationship with customers,” says Mr Fujii.

　　藤井彰表示：“我们做出的最重要举措是，邀请人们到美容院来，更好地了解他们的肌肤，并与客户建立联系。”

　　The strategy has given the brand renewed vigour. As many as 60 per cent of new customers are in their 20s and 30s, and the average age of their customers has fallen by 20 years.

　　这一战略让该品牌重新焕发活力。在该公司的新客户中，高达60%的比例年龄在20多岁或30多岁，客户的平均年龄年轻了20岁。

　　“Deflation doesn’t mean that consumers won’t buy anything,” says Mr Nakajima at Fujifilm. “It’s just that they don’t buy wasteful things.”“通缩并不意味着，客户不买东西，”富士的中岛成博表示，“而是他们不会买没用的东西。”