资本主义的悲惨世界里谁为阿根廷的债务哭泣

2014-07-08 17:25:52来源：可可英语

　　As I argued at the time, Argentina found itself in this position at the turn of the century. It was difficult to feel much sympathy for the country, which suffered from chronic mismanagement before its default in December 2001 and was to suffer yet more thereafter. But it had become impossible to service its public debt of $132bn at tolerable cost. Moreover, creditors had been rewarded for the possibility of default. Even at its lowest point, in September 1997, the spread of Argentine dollar bonds over US Treasuries was close to three percentage points. A creditor compensated for the risk of a default cannot be surprised by it. The solution is portfolio diversification.

　　正如我当时所提出的，阿根廷在世纪之交发现自己处于这种境地。我们很难对这个国家抱有太多同情，在2001年12月违约之前，该国就遭受长期管理不善，之后又遭受更多管理不善。但在当时，阿根廷已经不可能以可容忍的成本承受1320亿美元的公债负担。此外，债权人已经因为面对违约的可能性而得到回报。阿根廷美元债券对美国国债的利差，即便在1997年9月达到最低点时，也接近3个百分点。已经因为承担违约风险而得到补偿的债权人，不能对违约感到意外。解决方案是投资组合多元化。

　　While the principle of sovereign debt restructuring is compelling, in practice it is difficult. No court can seize and then liquidate a country’s entire assets. This legal limbo creates two opposing dangers: the first is that it is too easy for a country to walk away from its debts; the second is that it is too hard. The Argentine story illustrates both: confronted with an intransigent government, holders of 93 per cent of defaulted debt accepted exchanges for debt with a hugely reduced face value; but “holdouts”, who reject such an exchange, have blocked a clean resolution. The mess has lasted more than 12 years from the default.

　　尽管主权债务重组的原则颇有道理，但实际操作的难度很大。没有一家法院能够扣押然后变卖某个主权国家的全部资产。这一法律未决状态造成了两个相反的危险：一是一个国家要摆脱其债务太容易了;二是一个国家要摆脱其债务太困难了。阿根廷的经历证明了这两点：面对一个坚决赖账的政府，93%违约债务的持有人同意接受另一种面值剧减的债务;但拒不合作者阻碍了干净利落的解决。从违约开始计算，这一乱局延续了12年多。

　　As first deputy managing director of the International Monetary Fund, Anne Krueger advanced a proposal for a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism in 2002. She argued that the restructuring process could be delayed or blocked if some creditors were able to hold out for full payment.

　　作为国际货币基金组织(IMF)第一副总裁，安妮•克鲁格(Anne Krueger)于2002年提出了一份有关主权债务重组机制的建议。她提出，如果部分债权人能一直坚持要求获得全额偿付，那么重组过程可能被延迟或阻止。

　　Her ideas were more supranational than governments – above all, the US – could bear. But “collective action clauses” were at least introduced. Yet such clauses might not have prevented the success of holdouts over Argentina, led by Paul Singer of Elliott Management. As the IMF recently noted , these clauses “typically only bind holders of the same issuance”. A holdout creditor can “neutralise the operation of such clauses” if they secure a blocking position, normally more than 25 per cent.

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