股东价值最大化是否合理值得商榷

2014-10-10 15:59:27来源：可可英语

　　I am not the first person to worry about the joint-stock company. Adam Smith, founder ofmodern economics, argued: “Negligence and profusion . . . must always prevail, more or less,in the management of the affairs of such a company.” His concern is over what we call the“agency problem” – the difficulty of monitoring management. Others complain that companiesbehave like psychopaths: a company aiming at maximising shareholder value might concludeit would be profitable – and so perhaps even its duty – to pollute the air and water if allowedto do so. It might also use its resources to obstruct an appropriate regulatory response tosuch (mis) behaviour.

　　我并非是第一个对股份公司感到忧虑的。现代经济学创始人亚当•斯密(Adam Smith)指出：“玩忽职守和挥霍浪费……或多或少总是会在这类公司的管理过程中盛行。”他担心的是我们所称的“代理人问题”，即监督管理层的困难。另一些人抱怨称，公司的行为就像精神病患者：一家旨在实现股东价值最大化的公司可能认为，如果允许的话，污染空气和水将是合算的，或许这还是它的职责。它还可能利用自己的资源来阻碍监管机构对此类(不当)行为作出适当回应。

　　The economic argument for shareholder value maximisation and control is that, while all otherstakeholders are protected by contract, shareholders are not. They therefore bear the residualrisk. This being so, they need to control the company in order to align the interests ofmanagement with their own. Only then would they be prepared to make risky investments.

　　股东价值最大化和股东控制的经济理由是，其他所有利益相关者都受到合同的保护，但股东们没有。他们因此承担了“剩余风险”。有鉴于此，他们需要控制公司以便让管理层利益与他们自己的利益相一致。只有这样，他们才愿意进行高风险的投资。

　　Yet, while shareholders do indeed bear risks in their role as the insurers of solvency, they arenot the only stakeholders to do so. A host of others are also exposed to risks against whichthey cannot be fully protected by contract: long-term workers; long-term suppliers; and, notleast, the jurisdictions in which companies operate. Moreover, shareholders, unlike others, andparticularly employees, can hedge their risks by diversifying their portfolios. A worker cannotnormally work for many companies at the same time and nobody can hedge employee incomeby owning shares in other people, except via taxation.

　　然而，尽管股东的确因“偿付承保人”的角色而承担了风险，但他们并非是承担风险的唯一利益相关者。其他许多人也暴露在无法得到合同充分保护的风险之下：长期员工，长期供应商，以及更为重要的，公司经营地所属的司法管辖地。此外，与其他人(尤其是员工)不同，股东可以通过多元化投资组合来对冲他们的风险。员工通常无法同时为许多公司工作，也没有人可以通过拥有其他人的股份来对冲薪资收入，除了通过税收以外。

　　The doctrine of shareholder value maximisation has allowed us to believe that the existence ofthese long-lived, hierarchical and powerful entities has not changed the market economyfundamentally. But, as Colin Mayer of Oxford’s Saïd Business School argues in his splendidbook, Firm Commitment, this approach also misses the true purpose of the company.

　　股东价值最大化的信条让我们相信，这些长期存续、等级分明的强大实体的存在，没有从根本上改变市场经济。但正如牛津大学(Oxford)赛德商学院(Saïd Business School)的科林•迈耶(Colin Mayer)在其精彩著作《坚定承诺》(Firm Commitment)中论述的那样，这种看法也忽视了公司的真正目的。

　　Companies, argues Professor Mayer, are a mechanism for sustaining long-term commitments.But such commitments will only work if it is costly for the parties to act opportunistically.Moreover, it is often in the interests of all parties to bind themselves not to behave in such away. But, with an active market in corporate control, such commitments cannot be made.Those who make the promises may disappear before they can deliver.

　　迈耶表示，公司是一种维持长期承诺的机制。但此类承诺只有在相关方采取机会主义行动代价高昂的时候才会有效。此外，约束自己不采取机会主义行动通常也符合所有人的利益。但由于公司控制权市场非常活跃，相关方不可能做出此类承诺。那些做出承诺的，可能在履行承诺之前就会消失。

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