股东价值最大化是否合理值得商榷

2014-10-10 15:59:27来源：可可英语

　　These commitments take the form of implicit – or not fully specified – contracts. Why do wehave to rely on implicit contracts? Long-term commitments could in theory be managedinstead by trying to specify every eventuality. About a second’s thought makes it clear thatthis is impossible. It would not just be inconceivably complex and costly. It would come upagainst the deeper problem of uncertainty. We have little idea of what might happen in thenext few months, let alone the next few decades. If people are to make long-termcommitments, trust is the only alternative. But a company whose goal is whatever seemsprofitable today can be trusted only to renege on implicit contracts. It is sure to actopportunistically. If its managers did not want to do so, they would be replaced. This isbecause, as Prof Mayer argues: “The corporation is a rent extraction vehicle for theshortest-term shareholders.” Aligning managerial rewards to shareholder returns reinforces theopportunism.

　　这些承诺以隐性(或不完全明确的)合同形式存在。我们为何不得不依赖隐性合同?就理论而言，我们可以通过努力明确所有可能性来管理长期承诺。但稍微想一下就知道这是不可能的。不仅其复杂性和成本会高到难以想象，而且还会遇到不确定性的更深层次问题。我们连今后几个月将会发生什么事都不知道，更别说今后几十年了。而如果人们要做出长期承诺，信任是唯一的选择。但对于一家今天只以不择手段盈利为目标的公司，人们只能相信它必将背弃隐性合同。它肯定会采取机会主义的行为。如果它的经理们不想这么做，他们就会被替换掉。正如迈耶指出的那样，这是因为：“对最短期的股东来说，企业是一个抽租工具。”将管理层奖励与股东回报挂钩强化了这种机会主义。

　　In practice, many capitalist economies do mitigate the risks of shareholder value maximisationand the market in corporate control. This is true of continental Europe, notably Germancompanies. But it is also, notes Prof Mayer, true in the US, where the idea that managementshould be protected against shareholders is widely accepted in practice, if not so much intheory. The country that has taken the idea furthest is the UK.

　　在实践中，许多资本主义经济体的确减轻了股东价值最大化和公司控制权市场的风险。欧洲大陆就是如此，尤其是德国公司。但迈耶指出，美国同样如此——在美国，人们普遍在实践中认可应防止管理层遭受股东侵害的观点(理论上则接受程度较低)。最大程度接受这种观点的国家是英国。

　　Prof Mayer argues rightly: “The defect of existing economic models of the corporation is innot recognising its distinguishing feature – the fact that it is a separate legal entity. Thesignificance of this stems from the fact that it is thereby capable of sustaining arrangementsthat are distinct from those that its owners, its shareholders, are able to achieve.” It is, inother words, in the shareholders’ interests not to control companies completely. They need tobe able to tie their hands.

　　迈耶正确地指出：“企业现有经济模式的缺陷在于没有认识到其独特的特征，即它是一个单独法律实体的事实。该特征之所以重要，源于公司因此能够维持与其所有者和股东能够实现的安排不同的安排。”换言之，不完全控制公司符合股东的利益。他们需要能够管住自己的手。

　　Prof Mayer’s suggested solution is what he calls a “trust company”, one with explicit valuesand a board designed to oversee them. He justifies such a radical switch with his scepticismabout the feasibility and effectiveness of regulation. Less radical would be to encouragecompanies to consider divergent structures of control. One might be to vest voting rights inshares whose ownership can be transferred only after a holding period of years, not hours. Inthat way, control would be married to commitment. One could also vest limited controlrights in some groups of workers. Yet this is not to argue that committed long-termownership is always preferable. Family control, for example, has both weaknesses andstrengths.

　　迈耶提议的解决方案被他称作“信托公司”，这种公司有明确的价值标准，以及对之进行监督的董事会。他怀疑监管的可行性和有效性，因此认为如此激进的方案是合理的。较不激进的方案是鼓励公司考虑采用分散的控制结构。比如，授予人们带有投票权的股份，而这些股份只有在持有几年、而非几小时之后才可以转让，通过这种方式将控制与承诺绑在一起。还可以将有限控制权授予某些员工群体。然而，这并不是说，有承诺的长期所有权总是可取的。例如，家族控制就有利也有弊。

本文关键字: 股东价值最大化是否合理值得商榷