双语新闻：国际货币体系发生变化竞争者对IMF有益

2014-10-28 17:28:58来源：网络

　　Such actions demonstrate the IMF’s worth. But its legitimacy remains in doubt. Emergingmarkets harbour a strong suspicion that if they found themselves in trouble, they wouldreceive smaller loans under more stringent conditions. When it comes to mediating currencywars they see an institution that is impatient when developing countries seek competitiveadvantage in a weak currency – but which readily acquiesces when big western economiesembark on massive programmes of monetary easing that might also be seen as a form ofcompetitive devaluation.

　　这些举动证明了IMF的价值，但其合法性仍然存疑。新兴市场严重怀疑，如果它们陷入麻烦，从IMF获得的贷款会更少，条款也会更苛刻。在IMF调停货币战时，新兴市场看到的情况是，当发展中国家试图通过货币贬值寻求竞争优势时，IMF的反应很不耐烦，但当西方大型经济体推出也可被视为某种竞争性贬值的大规模货币宽松计划时，IMF却轻易默许。

　　The IMF’s real strength is its ability to assess countries’ macroeconomic and financial policiesand evaluate what they mean for the world economy. The Fund should make theseassessments its main job. It could do them better if it was no longer doing the frontline work ofrescuing troubled economies. Combining the two functions makes it needlessly vulnerableto accusations of favouritism.

　　IMF的真实强项在于其评估各国宏观经济政策和金融政策的能力，以及评估这些政策对全球经济影响的能力。IMF应该将评估作为自己的主业。如果它不再亲身上阵、参与问题经济体的纾困工作，那么它在评估工作上会做得更好。集两个职能于一身，使得IMF毫无必要地成为易受偏袒指责的靶子。

　　Lending with conditions could be managed by regional insurance pools and backed up by IMFmoney if needed. At a time of crisis, the IMF would be called upon to develop a realistic planfor a country to rectify its policies. The country would simultaneously negotiate with therelevant regional monetary fund for a loan programme. Any watering down of the IMF’srecommendations would make it obvious how much the country in trouble was beingsubsidised by others in its regional group. Such decisions would be political, as they always are.But other countries in the group would be fully informed about the costs of bailing out one oftheir own.

　　附加条件的贷款可以由地区保险池来处理，如有必要的话，IMF可给予支援。在发生危机的时候，可以让IMF出面制定一个实际可行的方案，供一国修正政策时借鉴。这个国家可同时与相关的地区货币基金谈判，得出一个贷款方案。只要对IMF的建议打任何折扣，问题国家从本地区集团的其他成员国接受了多少补贴就会显露无遗。这样的决策将是政治性的，始终如此。但同一集团中的其他国家能充分知晓它们对“自己人”纾困的成本是多少。

　　Could a dominant country in a regional pool sabotage a smaller country’s borrowing for pettypolitical reasons? Yes, but the option of an IMF loan takes the edge off large countries’ threatsto run the regional insurance pools however the fancy takes them.

　　在地区保险池中占有主导地位的国家，是否有可能因卑鄙的政治原因破坏较小国家的借款计划?有可能，但因为IMF也可以提供贷款，使得大国随心所欲操纵地区保险池的威胁降低了。

　　Some western policy makers have argued that allowing regional funds to compete with theIMF could trigger a race to the bottom, in which countries play different would-be rescuers offagainst each other in an attempt to negotiate less onerous conditions. This is a red herring.The IMF and the regional funds would have the same incentives to maintain their credibilityand protect their investment. They have strong reasons to aim for good economic outcomes.

　　一些西方政策制定者一直主张，允许地区基金与IMF竞争，可能引发逐底竞争(race to the bottom)，国家可能会让潜在的纾困者“鹤蚌相争”，以期为自己争取到不那么苛刻的条款。这是伪命题。IMF和地区基金拥有同样的动机去维持自己的可信度、保护自己的投资。它们有充分理由致力于实现良好的经济效益。

　　Rather than whinge about China’s plans to set up competing institutions, the US and otheradvanced economies ought to take quicker action to reform the governance of the ones theydominate. Co-operation is not all it is cracked up to be. The IMF has long advocated thebenefits of greater competition and market discipline in place of the cosy status quo.Perhaps the IMF itself, and the governance system for global finance, would be better servedby being subject to some of both.

　　与其对中国计划成立与IMF针锋相对的组织表示不满，美国和其他发达经济体应该更迅速地采取行动，改革它们所主导的那些组织的治理。合作并不像人们说的那样好。IMF长期以来一直宣扬加大竞争、加强市场纪律以打破舒服现状的好处。或许施行这两项原则对IMF本身、以及国际金融治理体系也有好处。

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