Examination of Germany’s sectoral financial balances – the differences between income andspending of the government, private sector and foreigners – strengthens this point. Theresponse of the German private sector to the reforms of the early 2000s was to increasefinancial surpluses massively: that is, to spend far less than their incomes. Since the fiscaldeficit also shrank, the capital outflow soared. This is striking and significant. In brief, theresponse of the private sector to the labour market reforms and fiscal tightening was tobecome increasingly frugal and so accumulate large quantities of (often poor-quality) foreignassets.
查看德国各部门的收支平衡情况,即政府、私人部门和外资的收支差距,就能更明显地看出这一点。德国私人部门对本世纪头几年哈尔茨改革的反应是,大幅增加财务盈余,即支出大大少于收入。由于政府财政赤字也缩水了,资本外流飙升。这是显著和突出的。简而言之,私人部门对劳动力市场改革和财政紧缩的反应是变得越来越节约,从而积攒下数量巨大(但往往质量低下)的海外资产。
In terms of raising private domestic demand, reforms achieved little. On the contrary,Germany became heavily dependent on foreign demand. Similarly, fiscal tightening did notunleash stronger private spending. Expecting similar labour-market reforms to promotedemand in France and Italy is likely to prove highly over-optimistic.
在提高私人部门内需方面,改革收效甚微。相反,德国变得严重依赖外需。类似的,财政紧缩未能让私人支出变得更强劲。指望类似的劳动力市场改革能在法国和意大利提升需求,很可能将被证明是过于乐观。
This does not mean reforms achieved nothing. Germany has low unemployment despite quiteweak growth. The UK also has relatively low unemployment despite still weaker post-crisiseconomic growth. In both cases, the labour reforms encouraged the sharing of a largenegative shock across the population via stagnant or even falling real earnings. A symptomof this form of an adjustment is weak productivity. In German industry, productivity hasnot risen since 2007. Productivity performance has also been poor in the UK. But Germanunemployment was 4.9 per cent in July and the UK’s only 6 per cent against 10.4 per cent inFrance.
这不是说哈尔茨改革没有取得任何成果。尽管增长非常疲弱,但德国实现了低失业率。英国尽管在金融危机后经济增长仍然疲弱,但失业率也较低。在这两个例子里,劳动力市场改革都通过实际收入的停滞甚至下降,将大规模的负面冲击分散至整个人口。这种调整的特征之一就是低生产率。在德国工业中,生产率自2007年起就没有再提高过。英国的生产率表现也一直不理想。但德国7月失业率为4.9%,英国仅6%,而法国为10.4%。
The upshot is that labour market reforms do little if anything to promote demand; inGermany’s case, much of the demand has come from abroad. What might this mean for theeurozone as a whole? A theoretical possibility is that the eurozone would seek to generate acurrent account surplus that is as big relative to GDP as Germany’s. This would mean asurplus not of $300bn, as in 2013, but of $900bn.
结果是,劳动力市场改革对促进需求毫无作用、或作用很小。在德国的例子中,很大一部分需求来自国外。这对整个欧元区意味着什么?在理论上,一个可能性是欧元区将寻求创造与德国一样高的经常账户盈余与GDP比率。这意味着欧元区的经常账户盈余必须从2013年的3000亿美元增至9000亿美元。
This could never be sustained: the rest of the world would not absorb it and an appreciationof the euro is likely to defeat it. The proper complement to structural reform is additionaldemand inside the eurozone. That is needed, in any case, to eliminate the difficulties beingcreated by ultra-low inflation and the possibility of deflation. German core inflation of only1.2 per cent is too low to let adjustment work satisfactorily.
这种状况绝不可能持续:世界其余地区无法吸收欧元区这样大的经常账户盈余,欧元的升值也很可能使之挫败。能够对结构改革形成合理补充的措施是,在欧元区内部创造额外需求。无论如何,这样的措施对克服超低通胀以及通缩可能性造成的困难都是必需的。德国仅1.2%的核心通胀率太低,无法让调整产生令人满意的效果。
With conventional monetary policy at its limits, the choices are between unconventionalmonetary policy or expansionary fiscal policy. Germany is extremely uncomfortable withboth.
鉴于常规货币政策已到达极限,我们只能选择非常规货币政策或扩张性财政政策——这两种政策在德国看来都是下策。
Yet, partly because of its haven status, Germany is also able to borrow at extraordinarilyfavourable interest rates. The 30-year Bund is now yielding 1.8 per cent. If one assumes theEuropean Central Bank will meet its inflation target, this means a long-term real interest rateof zero. Such negligible costs of borrowing must transform views of the costs of fiscaldeficits. Germany should both refinance its debt at such rates and borrow to finance additionalpublic investment. Focusing on deficits and debts, without noticing the interest rate, makes nosense. In the same way, the focus on whether the French deficit breaks the rules is absurd.Even French 10-year bonds are yielding 1.1 per cent. The markets are screaming: borrow.
然而,部分缘于其避险地的地位,德国还能够以极为优惠的利率借款。30年期德国国债眼下的收益率为1.8%。如果假设欧洲央行(ECB)能够实现其通胀目标,这意味着长期实际利率为零。借款成本低得可忽略不计,必然会改变人们对财政赤字成本的看法。德国应该以这样的利率对其债务进行再融资,并增加借债为额外的公共投资提供资金。抛开利率关注赤字和债务是不合理的。同样,关注法国的赤字水平是否超标也是荒谬的。就连法国的10年期债券收益率都为1.1%。各个市场都在尖叫:多借钱!
本文关键字: 欧元区值得为扩张政策冒险
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