曾经的美国传奇高盛已盛况不再

2014-10-23 14:40:26来源：可可英语

　　Nor is the recent story reassuring. In the 12 months from June 2013 to June 2014, Goldmanadded $1.6 billion in capital. Its 12-month trailing earnings during that period, however,declined from $8.4 billion to $7.6 billion. So its ROE, driven by higher capital and lower profits,actually dropped from 11.8% to just over 10.6%.

　　最近的情况同样让人担心。从2013年6月到2014年6月这12个月里，高盛的股本增加了16亿美元，而同期，该公司的盈利则从84亿美元跌至76亿美元。由于股本增加而利润下滑，其净资产收益率从11.8%跌到了10.6%。

　　These sluggish returns have been weighed down by Goldman’s primary franchise, trading.Today, Goldman holds an inventory of around $350 billion in securities that it has purchasedfrom clients, and seeks to resell, at the widest margins possible. From 2008 to 2010, Goldmanearned an average of 3.8% on its trading book. But since 2011, the margin has dwindled to aslender 1.2% to 1.3%.

　　高盛的主营交易业务令疲弱的回报雪上加霜。目前，高盛从客户手中购买的库存股约为3,500亿美元，该公司力求以最大的利润率转售。2008年至2010年，高盛的交易账户平均回报为3.8%。但是自2011年以来，利润率严重缩水到1.2%至1.3%。

　　The problem is basic: That inventory isn’t “turning over” nearly as fast as it used to, becausehedge funds, mutual funds, and other clients have slowed the pace of their trading. Nor arespreads nearly as rich as in the aftermath of the financial crisis.

　　问题很简单：库存的“周转”无法达到以前的水平，因为对冲基金、共同基金和其他客户的交易均已放缓。息差也无法达到金融危机之后的水平。

　　To return to its glory days, Goldman will need to generate far higher returns on that tradingbook. That’s the ticket to driving returns on equity to heights that would prove alluring in thecoming, rising-rate environment of tomorrow.

　　要重现往昔的辉煌，高盛需要大幅提升其交易账户的回报。这是推升净资产收益率，从而在未来加息的环境中抢占优势的关键。

　　In its 2013 proxy statement, Goldman revealed that it has set a 12% ROE target for a fullpayout on its long-term compensation plan. That’s an increase from just 10%, a surprisinglymodest goal for such a hard-charging management team. But to reach even 12%, Goldmanstill has a ways to go.

　　在2013年的股东委托书中，高盛设定了12%的净资产收益率目标，以能够完全支付公司的长期薪酬方案。这一比例仅略微高于之前的10%，对于高盛强硬的管理层来说，这个目标可以说是非常卑微。但是，即便是12%，对于高盛来说也不容易。

　　“The 12% target is still a low bar,” says Davis. “I’m thinking 14% to 16% is where they shouldbe.” He believes Goldman will get there. “If they can’t get to a 15% ROE in a business, they’llget out of it,” he says. “It will take them a couple of years to get through it. If anyone canfigure it out, they can.”

　　“12%的目标仍然是很低的。”戴维斯说，“我认为应该是14%到16%。”他相信高盛可以达到目标。“如果某项业务达不到15%的净资产收益率，他们可能就会放弃这块。这可能需要好几年的时间才能理顺。但是，如果其他人能找到出路，那么他们也能。”

　　Indeed, when interest rates rise, trading could explode as investors pile into bonds. Thattrend would produce what Goldman needs most: A jump in turnover and margins in its bigsecurities portfolio. Goldman fans also argue that because of the new capital requirements,big banks have exited fixed income, currency, and commodities trading. Hence, Goldman couldfind itself in a more commanding position than at any time in its recent history.

　　事实上，如果利率上调，投资者会涌向债券市场，交易可能会暴增。这一趋势正是高盛所急需的：增加周转率，并且大型的证券投资组合利润上扬。高盛的支持者们还提出，美国新的银行资本充足率要求，导致大银行已退出固定收益、外汇和大宗商品交易。所以，高盛可能会发现它在这些领域可以“一览众山小”。

　　That scenario is certainly possible. It’s also possible that bond trading, Goldman’s strength,could go the way of market making in equities. Once highly lucrative, stock trading hasbecome a low-margin, commoditized field executed on electronic platforms. New bankingregulations mandate that derivatives go electronic as well. If the opaque bond marketbecomes more, rather than less, competitive, Goldman will fail to restore its once-sovereignprofitability. If fixed income booms again—and especially if Goldman emerges as theunchallenged king of bond trading—it will be on the road to a great restoration. Think of itas the Yankees capturing yet another World Series.

　　这种情况完全有可能发生。另外的一个变数是，高盛占据优势的债券交易业务可能会重蹈股票交易的覆辙。股票交易业务曾经极为赚钱，但是现在已经沦为在电子平台执行的低利润率商品化交易。新的银行规定要求衍生品也进行电子交易。如果不透明的债券市场的竞争因此有增无减，高盛将难以保住过去的一流盈利能力。但是，如果固定收益市场盛景再现，尤其是高盛如果能杀出重围，成为债券交易界无可匹敌的霸主，那么这将是一条引领其走向伟大复兴的道路。这就好比洋基队在世界职业棒球大赛(World Series)中再一次扬眉吐气。

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